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Abstract 
According to financial theory, corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence 
of capital market imperfections such as direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly exter-
nal financing, and taxes. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the extensive existing 
empirical literature that has tested these theories, documenting overall mixed empirical support 
for rationales of hedging with derivatives at the firm level. While various empirical challenges 
and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the 
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tools, and the operating environment of the firm. In particular, recent evidence suggests that de-
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According to financial theory, corporate hedging can increase shareholder value in the presence 
of capital market imperfections such as direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly exter-
nal financing, and taxes. This paper presents a comprehensive review of the extensive existing 
empirical literature that has tested these theories, documenting overall mixed empirical support 
for rationales of hedging with derivatives at the firm level. While various empirical challenges 
and limitations advise some caution with regard to the interpretation of the existing evidence, the 
results are, however, consistent with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial 
strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk-management 
tools, and the operating environment of the firm. In particular, recent evidence suggests that de-
rivatives use is related to debt levels and maturity, dividend policy, holdings of liquid assets, and 
the degree of operating hedging. Moreover, corporations do not just use financial derivatives, but 
rely heavily on pass-through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial 
risk. 
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1 Motivation 
Non-financial firms engage in corporate risk management on a regular basis, as documented 
in their annual reports or surveys of derivatives’ use (see e.g. Bodnar et al., 2003; 1999; 
1998; Tufano, 1996 for the U.S.). For most non-financial firms, the main objective of their 
risk-management activities consists of hedging against foreign exchange rate and interest rate 
risk (84% and 76% of the U.S. survey’s derivatives’ users, respectively), even though firms 
often also attempt to time hedging decisions based on their market views, a practice called 
‘selective hedging’ (Brown et al., 2006). The fact that derivatives use is common practice 
appears prima vista in line with existing positive theories that justify risk management at the 
firm level as beneficial to the shareholders of a firm in the presence of capital market imper-
fections. While these theories suggest several ways in which corporate hedging can increase 
shareholder value (e.g. by lowering the costs of financial distress), the empirical evidence 
that numerous studies provide remains controversial and without a clear bottom line. 
Therefore, this paper contributes to the literature by providing a detailed and compre-
hensive overview and analysis of the theoretical arguments and the corresponding empirical 
evidence in the existing literature pertaining to corporate risk management as a lever for 
shareholder value creation. In particular, it summarizes theoretical arguments suggesting that 
shareholders’ wealth can be increased through corporate hedging by exploiting capital mar-
ket imperfections that result in underinvestment and asset substitution problems, costly di-
vergent interests between managers and shareholders, costly external financing, direct and 
indirect costs of financial distress, and taxes. The paper reviews the proxy variables that have 
been used to test these hypotheses, as well as presents and discusses the empirical evidence 
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of the many studies testing positive rationales of corporate hedging. While there is some evi-
dence in support of theoretical predictions, the empirical results are overall fairly mixed. 
Thus, it would appear that existing theoretical explanations have little to no explanatory 
power for determining which firms use derivatives. At the same time, it may be that risk 
management arises from other factors not well motivated by existing risk management the-
ory, such as earnings smoothing, speculation, or industry competition, that are difficult to 
examine empirically (Core et al., 2002; Brown, 2001; Tufano, 1996). Nevertheless, the re-
sults are in line with derivatives use being just one part of a broader financial strategy that 
considers the type and level of financial risks, the availability of risk-management tools, and 
the operating environment of the firm. In particular, recent evidence suggests that derivatives 
use is related to debt levels and maturity, dividend policy, holdings of liquid assets, and the 
degree of operating hedging (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009). Moreover, corporations do 
not just use financial derivatives, but rely heavily on pass-through, operational hedging, and 
foreign currency debt to manage financial risk (Bartram, Brown and Minton, 2009; Guay and 
Kothari, 2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003). Overall, these corporate hedging activities ap-
pear to be effective, since an extensive literature shows only weak evidence of the effect of 
financial risks, such as unexpected exchange rate changes, on stock returns. 
At the same time, a number of empirical challenges and potential shortcomings may 
limit the conclusions that can be drawn from some of the existing evidence. In particular, 
most empirical studies fail to account for the endogeneity of variables describing different 
dimensions of corporate financial policy and strategy, such as investment opportunities, lev-
erage, dividends, etc. Worse, there are significant identification problems for techniques such 
as simultaneous equations models. To illustrate, most determinants of leverage are also im-
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portant for hedging decisions. Few studies have tried to address these issues with simultane-
ous equations or structural corporate finance models that may reduce some of these issues 
and take a step towards yielding unbiased estimates of the underlying structural parameters. 
A detailed understanding of the underlying structural parameters is also required in or-
der to be able to properly capture complex relations between risk management and other cor-
porate policies/characteristics. To illustrate, growth opportunities imply stronger motives for 
corporate hedging due to bigger underinvestment problems, but they are also associated with 
fewer free cash flow problems, which reduce the incentives to hedge. The complexities of 
these relations make it difficult to estimate such firm-specific parameters using cross-
sectional data. 
Furthermore, there are several challenges with capturing financial risk management at 
the firm level. While financial theory provides rationales for corporate hedging in general 
and while firms use a combination of different hedging channels in corporate practice (in-
cluding derivatives, foreign currency debt, operational hedging, and pass-through), empirical 
tests frequently focus only on derivatives use at the firm level. Moreover, it is difficult to 
assess the extent of hedging accurately, due to the complex combination of various hedging 
tools with different time horizons, payoff profiles, notional amounts, exercise prices, etc., and 
also due to limited accounting disclosure and time-varying exposures. Finally, most empiri-
cal studies classify firms as either hedgers or non-hedgers, without allowing for the possibil-
ity that a firm could move between the two groups over time. Such problems limit the power 
of the tests. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents various theoretical arguments 
motivating hedging at the firm level as a source of shareholder value. It also presents the 
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proxies that can be used to test the theoretical predictions as well as the corresponding exist-
ing empirical evidence. The section ends with a discussion of the empirical challenges and 
limitations of empirical tests of risk management theories. Finally, Section 3 provides a 
summary and conclusion of the paper. 
2 Theory and Evidence of Value Creation through Corporate Risk Manage-
ment 
Basic economic theory seems to imply that corporate risk management cannot contribute to 
the creation of shareholder value (see Dufey and Srinivasulu, 1983, for an extensive discus-
sion). For example, according to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) propositions corporate 
financing decisions cannot be used to increase firm value in perfect capital markets since 
shareholders can easily replicate them. Consequently, since corporate risk management can 
be seen as a financing policy, it cannot contribute to firm value creation in an M&M world 
(Bartram, 2002; Stulz, 2000; 1996; Smith, 1995; Culp et al., 1994; Mayers and Smith, 1982). 
As a result, for corporate risk management to increase firm value it must be the case 
that one or more of the assumptions of the M&M framework are violated. In other words, the 
benefits of corporate hedging (if they exist) should arise due to capital market imperfections, 
which prevent shareholders from being able to perfectly replicate risk management at the 
firm level (Stulz, 2001; Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995; Smith et al., 1990).1 As discussed below, 
capital market imperfections that provide positive rationales for corporate risk management 
consist e.g. of direct and indirect costs of financial distress, costly external financing, and 
                                                 
1 High firm complexity might be another reason for shareholders to be unable to replicate firms’ corpo-
rate hedging decisions (see Dolde and Mishra, 2007). 
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taxes. In addition to these firm-specific determinants of corporate risk management, the eco-
nomic and legal environment of the country a firm is located in may also impact the decision 
to hedge. 
Theories of corporate risk management are typically tested empirically using binary va-
riables that indicate whether a firm uses derivatives or not (e.g., Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 
2009; Mian, 1996; Nance et al., 1993), and the use of derivatives is interpreted as an indica-
tion of corporate hedging in general.2 For selected, commodity-based industries (e.g., oil, 
gold), sometimes more detailed information about the use of derivatives is available, ena-
bling empirical studies to use variables such as (net) notional values of derivatives or the 
percentage of production hedged, which might more accurately measure the extent of corpo-
rate hedging (Lel, 2006; Dionne and Triki, 2005; Haushalter, 2001; 2000; Tufano, 1996). 
Most empirical studies relate these proxies for corporate risk management to firm, in-
dustry or country characteristics in order to test whether firms with particular properties that 
according to financial theory should benefit most from corporate hedging are indeed more 
likely to use derivatives and/or use them to a larger extent (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; 
Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 1996). A large number of different proxies are used to test the 
                                                 
2 While derivatives can in principle also be used for speculative purposes, there is some evidence that 
firms do indeed use derivatives (mostly) for the purpose of hedging, though the evidence is not clear cut. In 
particular, some studies report few, if any, differences in risk between derivatives users and non-users (Hent-
schel and Kothari, 2001), or a slight reduction in the risk of firms that initiate the use of derivatives (Guay, 
1999). By the same token, results of Tufano (1996) and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) also support the idea of 
derivatives being used for hedging purposes. In contrast, there is also some, though limited evidence of specula-
tion (market timing) in firms’ interest rate risk management practices (Faulkender, 2005). However, several 
studies indicate that the gains from speculating (or ‘selective’ hedging) appear small at best (Adam and Fer-
nando, 2006; Brown et al., 2006). In an efficient market, one would expect them to be close to zero (or negative 
by the amount of transaction costs). Géczy et al. (2007) use survey data on derivatives usage by U.S. non-
financial firms to document that firms with weak internal governance structures that allow for greater manage-
rial power and fewer shareholder rights are more likely to indicate in the Wharton survey on derivatives usage 
that they take a view with derivatives. 
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underlying theories (Table 1).3 Moreover, a few studies analyze whether the determinants for 
the decision to hedge and the extent of hedging are different (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Al-
layannis and Ofek, 2001), while other studies consider different types of hedging, e.g. ex-
change rate or interest rate risk (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Graham and Rogers, 
2002), commodity price risk (Géczy et al., 2006; Haushalter, 2000), or alternative risk man-
agement strategies that do not involve derivatives (Petersen and Thiagarajan, 2000).4
Some studies investigate the impact of corporate governance on the importance of dif-
ferent rationales for hedging at the firm level (Lel, 2006). To illustrate, managers may use 
corporate hedging to increase the utility of their compensation packages particularly in firms 
with weak governance. Finally, there are also some studies that more directly test the value 
implications of corporate hedging, by relating derivatives use to leverage (Graham and Rog-
ers, 2002) or relative valuation metrics such as the market-to-book ratio (Mackay and Moel-
ler, 2007; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Allayannis and Weston, 2001).5
Nevertheless, almost all empirical work in this area faces some significant challenges 
that need to be considered when interpreting the results. To illustrate, endogeneity and identi-
                                                 
3 While the studies included in the tables that are discussed in this section are meant to provide a com-
prehensive overview of the empirical evidence on positive corporate risk management theories, the large num-
ber of studies on this subject makes it impossible to include all of them. As a result, some studies are excluded 
from the tables, particularly those that largely verify whether results obtained for the United States also hold for 
firms in other countries. 
4 Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) estimate a (simultaneously estimated) multivariate PROBIT model 
for FX, IR, and CP derivatives use, as well as ordered LOGIT models with the dependent variables as either the 
number of exposures (FX, IR, and CP) hedged, or the number of derivative types utilized (Forward, Futures, 
Swap, and Option). 
5 As discussed in more detail in Section 2.5, there are significant challenges to identifying the effect of 
corporate hedging on firm value. To illustrate, market-to-book ratios have been used as dependent variable of 
regressions with derivatives use as independent variable to measure the value effects of hedging. Nevertheless, 
market-to-book has also been used as a determinant of derivatives use. Since one measures in both cases the 
correlation between derivatives use and market-to-book, there exists a potential simultaneous equations problem 
that is rarely addressed in the literature. 
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fication problems, empirical modeling of structural relations, identifying appropriate proxy 
variables for corporate hedging beyond the use of derivatives, assessing the extent of corpo-
rate hedging in the face of multi-faceted hedging strategies and time-varying exposures, are 
major issues that many studies in this literature fail to address and, thus, potentially severely 
limit the conclusions that can be drawn from their results. 
2.1 Agency Costs 
2.1.1 Underinvestment and Asset Substitution Problems 
A company can be seen as a nexus of contracts between different parties, such as, e.g., man-
agers, shareholders, creditors, and employees (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Since managers, 
who run the company as agents on behalf of shareholders, are more involved in the daily 
activities of the firm, they enjoy an information advantage over their principals, i.e. share-
holders. Given that both groups may not share common goals, conflicts can emerge since it is 
typically not possible to prevent non-value maximizing behavior via perfect contracts (Fama 
1980). 
Yet even if managers act in line with shareholders’ interests, they still might forgo val-
ue-enhancing projects, if the gains of accepting these projects accrue mostly to bondholders 
(underinvestment problem). This situation arises typically when a firm is highly levered and 
firm value is low, as bondholders are reimbursed before shareholders, and thus valuable pro-
jects might not benefit shareholders. Solutions to this problem, such as, e.g., rewriting or 
negotiating debt contracts, are often costly and thus impractical (Smith et al., 1990; Myers, 
1977). 
While the underinvestment problem can be alleviated through reduction of debt out-
standing, corporate risk management can achieve the same goal without sacrificing the tax 
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benefits of debt. This stems from the fact that corporate hedging reduces the volatility of firm 
value and thus makes it less likely that firm value drops to levels at which there are incen-
tives for shareholders to forgo positive NPV projects (Smith, 1995; Bessembinder, 1991; 
Smith et al., 1990; Mayers and Smith, 1987). 
Further conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders can arise, however, 
as it is usually beneficial for shareholders of a leveraged firm to substitute highly risky in-
vestment projects, possibly even with negative NPV, for safe investment project (asset sub-
stitution or risk shifting problem). This incentive can be explained by the fact that sharehold-
ers’ claim on firm value has the properties of a call option on the assets of the firm with the 
debt value as strike price (Mason and Merton, 1985; Merton 1974). As the value of options 
increases with the volatility of the underlying asset, shareholders increase the value of their 
position by replacing safe assets with risky assets. 
Since debtholders anticipate this opportunistic behavior, they demand either higher 
yields on the capital provided and/or protective covenants. Both of these possibilities create 
additional costs that reduce firm value (Smith and Warner, 1979). Corporate risk manage-
ment stabilizes firm value and hence reduces the chance that states of the world occur in 
which shareholders have strong incentives to shift towards riskier assets (Smith, 1995; 
Campbell and Kracaw, 1990). Thus, if a firm has committed itself to a corporate hedging 
policy, agency costs are reduced. However, it is difficult for a company to credibly guarantee 
the continuing existence of corporate hedging, as it might consider discontinuing risk man-
agement, if it winds up in a situation in which taking on more risky projects is very beneficial 
(Stulz, 2001). 
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Nevertheless, Morellec and Smith (2007) show that shareholders will typically benefit 
from negotiating the issuance of debt and the hedging strategy simultaneously, since lenders 
will provide the same funds at a lower rate. Consistent with this result, many firms appear to 
arrange credit lines as well as hedging programs through the same financial institution, which 
enables the bank to monitor the borrowers’ hedging programs. Consequently, other financial 
institutions or contracting parties may also offer more favorable terms to companies that es-
tablish lines of credit and hedge positions with the same bank. 
Agency problems between principals and agents arise in a world of incomplete con-
tracting and asymmetric information. Variables used in empirical studies to proxy for such 
information asymmetries are the number (or the percentage) of outstanding shares owned by 
institutional investors, the number of large blockholders, usually with a stake above five or 
ten percent, the existence of multiple share classes, the number of analysts following a firm, 
and analysts’ mean accuracy and dispersion in forecasting a firm’s earnings. Firms that are 
owned to a large extent by institutional investors, tracked by a large number of analysts, that 
do not have multiple share classes, and whose earnings can be predicted with great accuracy 
and low dispersion face less informational asymmetry, and therefore should be less likely to 
hedge (DaDalt et al., 2002; Visvanathan, 1998; DeMarzo and Duffie, 1991). In contrast, the 
hypothesized sign of proxies for large blockholders depends on their diversification level. 
While a high percentage of well diversified outside blockholders should significantly en-
hance information availability and reduce incentives to hedge, corporate hedging could also 
be an effective way for less diversified outside blockholders to reduce their unsystematic 
risk. 
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There is only limited empirical evidence on the relation between corporate hedging and 
asymmetric information (Table 2). While variables proxying for institutional ownership and 
analysts following are generally significant, the effect is often not of the predicted direction 
(Graham and Rogers, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Géczy et al., 1997). Only more recent studies 
sometimes obtain the predicted association (Dionne and Triki, 2005; 2004). As theory sug-
gests, the existence of multiple share classes leads to higher derivatives’ use (Bartram, 
Brown and Fehle, 2009). Large blockholders are always negatively associated with corporate 
hedging (Mardsen and Prevost, 2005; Borokhovich et al., 2004; Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 
1996). Thus, if large blockholders are mainly well-diversified shareholders, which may be 
reasonable to assume, this would represent evidence supporting the asymmetric information 
argument. Finally, the mean accuracy and the dispersion of analysts’ earnings forecasts show 
significant associations with corporate hedging in the predicted directions (DaDalt et al., 
2002).6
Underinvestment and asset substitution problems are more important for firms with 
high growth opportunities, as the value of these firms would suffer most from failing to in-
vest into the available profitable projects, and high leverage, as these firms are more likely to 
end up in states of nature in which these conflicts can occur.7 As a result, high growth oppor-
tunities and high leverage should increase the incentives for corporate hedging. Proxies 
which measure the existence and magnitude of available growth opportunities include re-
search and development (R&D) expenditures, property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) expen-
                                                 
6 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argue that ownership structure is endogenous, giving rise to potentially im-
portant simultaneous equations biases for analyses that do not account for these effects. 
7 Since the investment opportunity set is important for both corporate hedging as well as leverage, poten-
tially important endogeneity bias problems exist. 
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ditures, the asset growth rate, and attempted acquisition activities. For certain industries (e.g., 
gold, gas, and oil producers), exploration expenditures are used as an alternative proxy. Since 
these proxies directly measure the resources invested into growth activities, there should be a 
positive relation between these variables and growth opportunities and, in turn, also a posi-
tive relation with corporate hedging (unless these variables also proxy for free cash flow 
problems). 
Other proxies measure the availability of positive NPV projects in a more indirect way, 
such as the earnings-to-price and the book-to-market ratio. A lower book-to-market ratio 
indicates higher availability of growth opportunities, suggesting a higher propensity to hedge. 
Similarly, firms with currently low earnings yet high share price appear to derive most of 
their firm value from profitable prospective expansion opportunities. Therefore, the earnings-
to-price ratio and corporate derivatives’ use should be negatively related. Finally, an increase 
in a firm’s growth opportunities is expected to lead to significant cumulative abnormal re-
turns (CARs) (Gay and Nam, 1998). As a result, companies with high CARs should be more 
inclined to hedge. 
Regulated industries are often characterized by lower levels of information asymme-
tries than other industries (Mian, 1996). Hence, it is easier for creditors to monitor the behav-
ior of managers, and thus to inhibit them from shifting risk or turning down profitable in-
vestment projects. Furthermore, it can be argued that regulated industries in general, first, do 
not enjoy the same growth opportunities as unregulated industries and, second, operate in 
more stable environments (Smith and Watts, 1992). It can thus be hypothesized that firms in 
regulated industries have a lower demand for corporate hedging than firms in unregulated 
industries. 
 11
Empirical results strongly support the hypothesized relation between R&D expendi-
tures and corporate risk management (Table 3) (Lin and Smith, 2007; Knopf et al., 2002; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Gay and Nam, 1998; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Fok et al., 1997; 
Géczy et al., 1997; Dolde, 1995; Nance et al., 1993). At the same time, the coefficients of 
PP&E expenditures, the asset growth rate, and the value of attempted acquisitions never have 
the correct sign at any conventional significance levels. Only one study finds the predicted 
relation between high exploration activities (in the gold mining industry) and derivatives’ use 
(Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002), while the evidence in other studies is either insignificant or in 
the opposite direction (Dionne and Triki, 2005; Haushalter, 2000; Tufano, 1996), which may 
be due to the relation between growth options and corporate hedging being more complex 
than conjectured in these empirical studies (Morellec and Smith, 2007). 
With regards to the more indirect measures of growth opportunities, the earnings-to-
price ratio, which is mainly used in earlier studies, offers some support for the agency cost 
hypothesis in multivariate tests (Gay and Nam, 1998; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996). More-
over, while hypotheses related to book-to-market are often not validated, CARs associate 
with corporate hedging at significant levels in the right direction (Gay and Nam, 1998). Fi-
nally, there is strong evidence suggesting that firms in regulated industries face lower incen-
tives to engage in corporate hedging (Rogers, 2002; Mian, 1996). 
The evidence partially supports the hypothesis that financial constraints concurrent 
with growth opportunities lead to a higher propensity for corporate hedging. These tests are 
based on interaction variables, such as the debt ratio multiplied with either the market-to-
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book ratio or R&D expenditures.8 Since large growth opportunities and high financial lever-
age increase the value of this interaction term, a positive relation between the interaction 
term and corporate risk management should be expected. Although this can be confirmed for 
the interaction term with the market-to-book ratio, no evidence is found for the interaction 
term based on R&D expenditures (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Graham and Rogers, 
2002; Géczy et al., 1997). Lastly, the positive association between corporate hedging and the 
interaction term of leverage with the market-to-book ratio appears to be conditional on strong 
corporate governance structures (Lel, 2006). 
Furthermore, the simultaneous effect of financial leverage and growth opportunities on 
corporate hedging can be tested by controlling for differences in cash ratios. By adding a 
cash dummy to the OLS regression, the evidence supports hypotheses related to the earnings-
to-price ratio, R&D expenditures, and CARs (Gay and Nam, 1998). Overall, however, the 
empirical support for theories of motives for corporate hedging based on agency costs of debt 
are mixed at best. 
2.1.2 Management Compensation, Incentive Structures, and Risk Preferences 
Managers and shareholders might also have divergent interests, because managers like to 
spend cash on perquisites when the proportion of managerial ownership in a company is low. 
In addition, managers likely consider their personal attitudes towards risk when choosing the 
company’s level of risk, which may not perfectly match shareholders’ preferences (May, 
1995; Smith and Stulz, 1985). While active monitoring can prevent managers from behaving 
in non-maximizing ways, no single shareholder has strong incentives to engage in monitor-
                                                 
8 Note that it is not clear that this approach is an adequate method to deal with the endogeneity issues. 
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ing, as the gains accrue to all other investors in case ownership is widely dispersed and moni-
toring is costly (free-rider problem). Large shareholders, however, such as institutional inves-
tors, have higher incentives to exercise careful vigilance, since they are not only bearing the 
costs, but also obtain a significant part of the benefits. Still, there are disadvantages to hold-
ing large blocks of shares in one company, such as foregone diversification benefits (Marko-
witz, 1952). 
Often, management has an undiversified wealth position in a firm due to current and 
future income and non-monetary utility components, such as reputation, awards, and promo-
tions. As managers’ welfare is strongly related to the ongoing existence of the business, man-
agers might be inclined to reduce the firm’s risk characteristics to levels conflicting with 
shareholder value maximization or, alternatively, to demand higher compensation for being 
exposed to high business risk (Mayers and Smith, 1990; Stulz, 1990; 1984). 
Risk management at the firm level can make it more attractive for undiversified inves-
tors to hold large equity-blocks by reducing idiosyncratic risk. As concentration among 
shareholders increases, so does monitoring, leading to more efficiently managed businesses 
and, in turn, higher cash flows (Stulz, 2001; Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995). With regards to man-
agement, corporate hedging might lower the variability and thus the level of compensation 
required by managers by decreasing firm-specific risk (DeMarzo and Duffie, 1995). More-
over, it might lower managers’ incentives to pursue more costly diversification strategies, 
like operative diversification of businesses (Bodnar et al., 1997; Berger and Ofek, 1995; 
Comment and Jarrell, 1995). 
In addition to monitoring, managerial incentive packages are often used to align the in-
terests of principals and agents by providing managers with incentives to focus on share-
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holder value. Consequently, managerial compensation is often tied to a firm’s stock price. 
Compensation and stock price can be linked linearly, as in case of managerial share pro-
grams, for which changes in firm value translate in a linear fashion into changes in compen-
sation.9 As managers are, however, more risk-averse than shareholders due to their undiversi-
fied wealth position, share programs induce managers to reduce firm-specific risk even fur-
ther. In contrast, non-linear incentive structures, like stock option programs, offer more than 
proportional benefits for increases in firm value, creating a convex payoff scheme. Therefore, 
non-linear compensation packages might, contrary to share programs, provide incentives for 
managers to bear more risk. 
Nevertheless, when management compensation is tied to the stock price, changes in 
compensation are sometimes unrelated to managers’ decisions, but are due to general market 
fluctuations, thus exposing managers to uncontrollable systematic risk. This might entail dys-
functional behavior, such as managers hurting firm value to lower their exposure (Stulz, 
2001). Moreover, the distinction between high- and low-qualified managers becomes blurred 
when management performance is distorted by non-core business risks. Consequently, corpo-
rate risk management can add value by alleviating the impact of market fluctuations on firm 
value, thus helping to distinguish between efficient and inefficient managers (Bartram, 2000; 
Campbell and Kracaw, 1987). In addition, a strengthened correlation between managerial 
                                                 
9 Note that the equity of a levered firm is like an option on the assets of the firm. In this sense equity also 
has a convex payoff structure, but less than a stock option. Note also that companies typically provide compen-
sation packages that include both company stock as well as stock options. One can think of a CEO’s salary as a 
contingent bond that makes coupon payments (salary) on a regular basis with some underlying uncertain princi-
pal (severance) that would be paid upon termination/retirement. If a firm goes bankrupt, the manager probably 
gets no severance payment, he loses the firm-specific human capital component, and it is (empirically) unlikely 
that he would be a CEO at another company. The value of this set of cash flows (bond) is greater the longer its 
expected maturity (time to termination), though big severance packages that are being paid may make that a 
questionable assumption. Finally, another way to think about executive compensation is as an annuity with a 
down-and-out barrier trigger that terminates the annuity at certain equity prices. This will not have a positive 
vega in all price states and so changes the standard implications for risk taking. 
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performance and shareholder value renders incentive programs more efficient tools for 
stimulating managers to focus on shareholder value. 
Theory models that examine agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders as 
well as between shareholders and managers simultaneously can lead to richer predictions 
than discussed so far. For instance, Morellec and Smith (2007) argue that corporate hedging 
can also control free cash flow problems. Thus, more growth options increase underinvest-
ment problems, but also imply fewer free cash flow problems because of fewer assets in 
place. Corporate risk management lowers the probability of both high and low cash flows, 
and thus reduces the costs of both overinvestment as well as underinvestment. 
Given the potential of corporate hedging to reduce the unsystematic risk of the firm, it 
can be argued that the amount (or percentage) of outstanding shares owned by large, ill-
diversified investors should be higher for firms that use derivatives. Hence, variables indicat-
ing the existence of blockholders other than managers or directors who hold shares in excess 
of 5% or 10% are used in some empirical studies. Contrary to theoretical predictions, this 
variable is generally negatively associated with corporate hedging (Table 4) (Haushalter, 
2000; Tufano, 1996). This result could be driven by the fact that the proxy used does not dis-
tinguish between diversified and ill-diversified investors, while the hypothesized effect per-
tains to investors that are not well diversified. Therefore, it could be sensible to use proxies 
that measure large blockholdings of more than 5% or 10% of shares and distinguish between 
different types of investors. 
Early empirical studies investigate the effect of management compensation packages 
on corporate hedging policies by analyzing the amount (or fraction) of shares and options 
held either by the CEO or by all directors and managers. In particular, these studies argue 
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that for firms that award company shares, managers face incentives to hedge more, and thus 
these variables should be positively correlated. Executive stock option programs, on the other 
hand, should be negatively associated with corporate risk management, as corporate hedging 
decreases the volatility of firm value, and therefore the value of stock options. 
These arguments, however, can be criticized on the grounds that they ignore the fact 
that management share and option programs can have different sensitivities of value towards 
changes in share price and volatility. For example, strike prices of management option plans 
are often set close to the market price, so that even modest performance moves them in-the-
money (Gay and Nam, 1998). More interestingly, anecdotal evidence suggests that deep out-
of-the-money options are in many cases replaced with at-the-money options (Browning and 
Jereski, 1997).10 These stock option plans therefore generate incentives similar to share pro-
grams. To overcome these issues, some studies employ the sensitivities of the value of the 
CEO portfolio with respect to changes in stock price and volatility, calculated with the 
Black-Scholes (1973) formula (Lel, 2006; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Knopf et al., 2002). 
Since inefficient and low-qualified managers benefit from the fact that non-business 
risks distort the relation between corporate performance and management skills, they have 
incentives to avoid corporate risk management (Breeden and Viswanathan, 2006). Also, if 
younger managers work harder than older managers and are motivated to build a strong repu-
tation, an officer’s tenure can be used as a measure to test for divergent interests between 
efficient and inefficient managers (Tufano, 1996). Besides an officer’s tenure, a manager’s 
educational background could also influence his corporate hedging policy (Dionne and Triki, 
2005). 
                                                 
10 Given recent changes in regulations, this has become much less likely. 
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The empirical evidence for the absolute value (or percentage) of shares owned by the 
CEO or directors and managers is overall mixed (Table 4) (Mardsen and Prevost, 2005; Di-
onne and Triki, 2004; Haushalter, 2000; Gay and Nam, 1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Berkman 
and Bradbury, 1996; Tufano, 1996). Studies examining the sensitivity of the CEO portfolio 
towards changes in the share price in general find more supportive results (Graham and Rog-
ers, 2002; Knopf et al., 2002). Additionally, the significant negative association between of-
ficers’ tenure and risk management provides evidence for the relevance of management qua-
lification (Tufano, 1996). Last but not least, it seems that only firms with weak corporate 
governance use derivatives to hedge the risks associated with executive stock plans (Lel, 
2006).11 Potential management performance indicators that could be considered in future 
research to control for management quality when testing the relations between derivatives 
use and company stock programs for management are economic value added (EVA), eco-
nomic profit (EP), or cash value added (CVA). 
There is also significant evidence for differences in managerial option holdings of 
companies using derivatives and those which do not, although the relation differs across ana-
lyses (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Dionne and Triki, 2004; Haushalter, 2000; Gay and 
Nam, 1998; Géczy et al., 1997; Tufano, 1996). Studies examining the sensitivity of the CEO 
portfolio towards changes in volatility find the theorized association in all but one case at 
conventional significance levels (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Knopf et al., 2002; Rajgopal 
and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002). Again, this association appears conditional on the corpo-
rate governance structure of the firms analyzed (Lel, 2006). In conclusion, hypotheses related 
                                                 
11 Note that governance measures may also be endogenous, inducing a potential simultaneous equations 
bias. 
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to agency conflicts between shareholders and managers are often only weakly confirmed as 
motives for value creation through risk management at the firm level. 
2.1.3 Coordinating Investment and Financing Policies 
Risk management at the firm level can increase firm value by aligning corporate investment 
and financing policies. As future cash flows are uncertain, internal funds that are used to fi-
nance growth opportunities often vary significantly. As a result, in situations in which inter-
nal funds are insufficient to finance all positive NPV projects, a firm is either forced to cut 
back on its investment plan or to raise external equity or debt. 
External capital, however, is costly due to agency conflicts. More specifically, as credi-
tors incorporate their expectations about bankruptcy and financial distress into their lending 
decisions, a non-zero probability of default induces them to demand higher yields on the 
company’s debt. Although this enables them to obtain a fair value from their investment, it 
increases the firm’s cost of debt and thus decreases firm value (Myers, 1993; 1984). Another 
way to protect their claims consists of covenants which restrict managerial decision-making 
with respect to financing and investment policies. These covenants can, however, also prove 
value reducing if they turn out ex post to deter managers from following sound investment 
projects (Bartram, 2000).12 Similarly, the issuance of new equity has a negative effect on 
firm value, as investors anticipate incentives of management to issue new stock when it is 
overvalued (Asquith and Mullins, 1986). 
Because of these costs of external capital, firms more often cut back on their invest-
ment expenditures than turn to financial markets, thereby foregoing profitable investment 
                                                 
12 Note that if covenants are chosen rationally, this cost is expected to be less than the expected benefits 
of controlling debt-related costs (Smith and Warner, 1979). 
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projects. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests that higher cash flow volatility may lead to 
permanent cutbacks in investment (Minton and Schrand, 1999). Corporate hedging can en-
sure that firms have sufficient internal funds to finance their profitable growth opportunities 
without having to raise outside capital – which however also reduces the discipline that capi-
tal markets impose on managers (Chang, 2000; Tufano, 1998). Moreover, firms exhibiting a 
strong natural association between the availability of and need for internal funds should face 
lower incentives to hedge (Spanò, 2001; Moore et al., 2000; Copeland and Copeland, 1999; 
Mello and Parsons, 1999; Fite and Pfleiderer, 1995; Santomero, 1995; Froot et al., 1994; 
1993; Lewent and Kearney, 1990). 
Similar to the asset substitution and the underinvestment problem, the coordinated fi-
nancing and investment hypothesis depends upon the existence of cash flow constraints and 
available growth opportunities in the presence of capital market frictions. As a result, the 
same proxies can be employed to test this hypothesis. Moreover, it can be investigated 
whether companies with a greater correlation between available and needed funds hedge less 
frequently than companies with a lower correlation. The existing evidence strongly supports 
this hypothesis (Gay and Nam, 1998). Likewise, there is strong support for the hypothesis 
that companies using derivatives exhibit a lower sensitivity of investment to pre-hedging 
cash flows (Allayannis and Mozumdar, 2004). In contrast, there is also evidence that the ef-
fect of derivatives use on cash flows is small (Guay and Kothari, 2003). Indirect evidence 
supporting this theory is found in Géczy et al. (1997), while direct evidence can be found in 
Minton and Schrand (1999). 
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2.1.4 Costs of Bankruptcy and Financial Distress 
Levered companies run the risk that their cash flows are not sufficient to meet all fixed pay-
ment obligations timely and in full. This risk increases with higher leverage or more volatile 
cash flows. A company that is unable to fulfill its fixed payment obligations is forced into 
bankruptcy, at which point creditors and shareholders try to recover their investments in the 
firm. However, although creditors are holders of priority claims, there is often a costly dis-
pute about the actual distribution of residual firm value (Warner, 1977a). 
Furthermore, even before a company is actually filing for bankruptcy, it may encounter 
indirect costs of bankruptcy, if insolvency is expected in the near future. These costs are due 
to the reluctance of suppliers and customers to deal with the company, a distraction of man-
agement attention, risk premia reflected in higher management and employee compensation, 
etc. Direct costs of bankruptcy accrue in the actual bankruptcy procedure and pertain mainly 
to lawyers’ charges, administrative and accounting fees, and expenses for expert witnesses. 
On average, direct costs of bankruptcy are usually only in the order of 1% to 3% of share-
holder value (Weiss, 1990; Warner, 1977b). In contrast, indirect costs tend to be much larger 
than direct costs and can approach 20% of company value (Cutler and Summers, 1988). 
The expected costs of financial distress stem mostly from low levels of company value, 
i.e. they are the product of the probability of these states of nature times the actual costs. As 
corporate risk management decreases the likelihood of reaching these left-tail realizations by 
reducing the volatility of firm value, it lowers the expected costs of financial distress (Stulz, 
2001; Raposo, 1999; Santomero, 1995; Dolde, 1993; Rawls and Smithson, 1990; Smith et al., 
1990; Mayers and Smith, 1982). However, corporate risk management increases firm value 
even further by enabling firms to carry more debt. In other words, by increasing the optimal 
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debt-equity ratio, it allows firms to enjoy greater tax shields (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Lel-
and, 1998). 
Given that corporate risk management can lower the present value of bankruptcy and 
financial distress costs, firms with a high probability of default and/or high financial distress 
costs should be more likely to engage in corporate hedging. This hypothesis can be tested 
using the long-term debt ratio and the interest coverage ratio, which both give an indication 
of the probability of financial distress. A firm with high leverage has higher payment obliga-
tions, and should therefore be more likely to experience difficulties in honoring these com-
mitments. It thus might have stronger incentives to hedge. In the same vein, the interest cov-
erage ratio should be negatively associated with corporate hedging, since a higher interest 
coverage ratio suggests more pre-tax income to satisfy committed payments. 
The use of the long-term debt ratio is not without controversy. If financial distress costs 
do not only depend on a firm’s debt ratio, but also on other industry-specific, exogenous fac-
tors (such as the level of competition, rivalry, etc.), a firm with high distress costs might have 
a low debt ratio, and still face high incentives to hedge. A modified financial distress proxy 
subtracts the industry’s median leverage ratio from the firm’s leverage ratio, and a debt ratio 
above-industry level would indicate a high probability of distress (Géczy et al., 1997). Fur-
thermore, it is possible that high leverage only leads to default in combination with a lack of 
available cash. A potentially better, more forward looking proxy for the default risk of a firm 
would consist of the default probability implied in the firm’s stock or option price (Bartram 
et al., 2007; Vassalou and Xing, 2004; Merton, 1974). As mentioned before, important en-
dogeneity problems exist with regards to financial leverage and derivatives use, since high 
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leverage might induce more hedging, but hedging also allows for a larger debt ratio with 
concomitant increases in tax shields. 
As cash and marketable securities can be used to cover financial obligations, particu-
larly short-term liabilities, higher short-term liquidity should result in a lower need for hedg-
ing. By the same token, companies that are paying high dividends have few incentives to 
hedge, as it can be argued that only highly liquid firms can commit themselves to paying out 
dividends. In contrast, if firms exhaust their liquidity by paying dividends, they might have 
incentives to hedge. Preferred stock and convertible debt may constrain firms financially and 
thus create greater distress costs (Géczy et al., 1997). Alternatively, they could be a means to 
control the firm’s agency conflicts and could thus act as substitutes for corporate risk man-
agement with derivatives (Nance et al., 1993), so that the direction of the relation of these 
variables with derivatives use is an empirical question. Moreover, there are also potentially 
important endogeneity biases with regards to dividend policy that complicate the analysis 
(Smith and Watts, 1992). 
Other market participants’ assessment of a firm’s survival chances might also help to 
proxy for the probability of bankruptcy and financial distress. More specifically, credit rat-
ings and the credit risk spread, i.e. the yield difference between a firm’s bonds and 10-year 
Treasury notes, contain important information about a firm’s financial risk. Firms with low 
credit ratings and high credit risk spreads should face a higher probability of distress, and 
they should thus be more inclined to use corporate hedging. 
By the same token, a firm’s profitability might also be a determinant of its corporate 
hedging policy, since less profitable companies likely have more difficulties in meeting their 
fixed payment obligations and thus run a higher risk of insolvency. As a result, these firms 
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will hedge more than more profitable firms. Popular measures of profitability are gross mar-
gin, sales, and the return on assets (ROA). Since the presence of tax-loss carry-forwards indi-
cates the existence of net losses during at least one of the last years, tax-loss carry-forwards 
should also be positively associated with corporate risk management. Furthermore, produc-
tion costs can be used to make inferences about the likelihood of financial distress, since, as a 
rule of thumb, for many firms financial distress becomes serious when prices drop below 
production costs, which is more likely to happen for firms with high production costs (Tu-
fano, 1996). 
Several studies employ discriminant analysis to predict the likelihood of a firm’s bank-
ruptcy. Firms with higher predicted probabilities of future bankruptcy, e.g. based on Z-scores 
(Altman, 1983), should be more inclined to hedge. Moreover, financial distress costs are a 
function of the extent of intangible assets. As tangible assets can be easily sold in case of 
bankruptcy, firms with a high proportion of tangible assets should have a lower level of fi-
nancial distress costs than firms with significant intangible assets. Since the costs of financial 
distress are not proportional to firm size (Warner, 1977b), small firms have higher distress 
costs (as a fraction of firm value). Similarly, firms with large advertising and selling, general, 
and administrative (SG&A) expenses often have more unique products that are harder to liq-
uidate quickly. 
The long-term debt ratio and the interest coverage ratio are widely used to test the fi-
nancial distress hypothesis. Despite the discussed potential endogeneity problems, most stud-
ies obtain a significant positive relation between the long-term debt ratio and corporate hedg-
ing (Table 5) (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Dionne and Triki, 2005; Graham and 
Rogers, 2002; Haushalter, 2000; Guay, 1999; Gay and Nam, 1998; Howton and Perfect, 
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1998; Fok et al., 1997; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Mian, 1996). This association, how-
ever, seems to be only significant for firms with strong corporate governance structures (Lel, 
2006). As different risk levels could distort the hypothesized relation between corporate 
hedging and the long-term debt ratio, it might be important to control for risk exposure 
(Dolde, 1995). After sorting sample firms into groups of similar primitive risk, the evidence 
strongly supports the predicted relation between corporate hedging and debt levels. 
The evidence also strongly suggests that users of derivatives exhibit lower short-term 
liquidity than those without derivatives (Lin and Smith, 2007; Allayannis et al., 2003; Dionne 
and Garand, 2003; Fok et al., 1997; Géczy et al., 1997; Tufano, 1996). With respect to divi-
dends (or dividend yields), however, no clear pattern emerges, i.e. while many studies obtain 
significant results, the relation varies across analyses (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; 
Dionne and Garand, 2003; Haushalter, 2000; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996; Mian, 1996). 
Similarly inconclusive results obtain for preferred stock and convertible debt, as these prox-
ies are often insignificant at conventional levels (Gay and Nam, 1998; Fok et al., 1997). 
To control for endogeneity in the choice of capital structure and hedging, these deci-
sions can be modeled simultaneously. The results of simultaneous equation models largely 
confirm a significant positive association between debt levels and hedging (Bartram, Brown 
and Fehle, 2009; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Géczy et al., 1997). This is evidence for in-
creased firm value via tax benefits of debt. For oil and gas producers, firms using derivatives 
show higher leverage ratios and lower current ratios than the industry median at the 1% sig-
nificance level (Haushalter, 2000). Finally, although the sign is sometimes in the predicted 
direction, the interest coverage ratio is often insignificant at conventional levels (Howton and 
Perfect, 1998; Fok et al., 1997; Berkman and Bradbury, 1996). 
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The remaining variables generate mixed results. For example, the evidence on credit 
ratings and production (or cash) costs is always significant with the correct sign (Dionne and 
Triki, 2004; Dionne and Garand, 2003; Haushalter, 2000). In univariate analyses, all three 
profitability measures indicate that counter to theory more profitable companies hedge more, 
while they are sometimes positively and sometimes negatively associated with derivatives 
use in multivariate tests. The evidence on tax-loss carry forwards is mixed, and will be exam-
ined more carefully in the next section. 
With regards to the size of financial distress costs, firms using derivatives show lower 
ratios of tangible assets to total assets than firms not using derivatives (Howton and Perfect, 
1998). In contrast, the evidence for variables proxying for the uniqueness of a firm’s products 
appears weak (Dolde, 1995). Moreover, the evidence suggests that large firms face stronger 
incentives to hedge than small firms, and thus seems to indicate that corporate hedging ex-
hibits significant economies of scale. However, there exists some evidence that the extent of 
corporate hedging and firm size are negatively related, i.e. for firms having a risk manage-
ment program in place small firms hedge more than large firms (Graham and Rogers, 2002; 
Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Haushalter, 2000). Results using the Z-score are similar (Francis 
and Stephan, 1990). In summary, there is some evidence suggesting that bankruptcy and fi-
nancial distress costs are important determinants of corporate hedging, but the evidence is not 
entirely unambiguous. 
2.2 Corporate Taxes 
If the tax schedule is convex, i.e. if taxes increase more than proportionally with taxable in-
come, volatile taxable income results in a higher tax burden than stable pre-tax income. To 
the extent that corporate hedging stabilizes taxable income, it creates value since savings 
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from higher income states exceed additional taxes from lower income states, thus lowering 
the average corporate tax burden (Stulz, 2001; Bartram, 2000; Graham and Smith, 2000; 
1999; Santomero, 1995; Smith, 1995; Kale and Noe, 1990; Mayers and Smith, 1990; Rawls 
and Smithson, 1990; Smith et al., 1990; Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Convexity in the tax schedule can be attributed to the influence of statutory progressiv-
ity. However, statutory progressivity is relatively limited in most tax systems (Mayers and 
Smith, 1990). In addition, indirect effects can give rise to convex tax functions. Most often, 
these indirect effects come through special tax preference items, explicitly tax-loss carry-
forwards and/or investment tax credits, which are subject to restrictive rules and regulations. 
As a consequence, in states of low income or losses firms are not able to fully utilize the ben-
efits of these effects (MacKie-Mason, 1990).13 Given the potential for corporate risk man-
agement to reduce the tax burden, firms with more income in the convex region of the tax 
code or with more special tax items, should have stronger incentives to use derivatives to 
hedge. Consequently, proxies to analyze this hypothesis either focus on income in the convex 
tax region or on special tax items. 
Taxable income, possibly averaged over several years, is typically used to assess 
whether the taxable income of a firm is in the convex region of the tax schedule. A more ap-
propriate proxy is to construct a 95% confidence interval around current earnings (Howton 
and Perfect, 1998). If this interval overlaps with the convex tax region, a firm is assumed to 
face convexity in its tax code. As tax schedules in most countries are convex up to the high-
est marginal tax rate and then become linear, a low tax rate indicates a stronger impact of 
convexity. Finally, the most elaborate and accurate procedure is to compute the tax savings 
                                                 
13 Results in Graham and Smith (2000) suggest that the effect of these factors is small, however. 
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(or increases) from a 5% reduction in income volatility. Under convex tax regimes, volatility 
reductions lead to tax savings. Other proxies are scaled measures of tax-loss carry-forwards, 
foreign tax credits or investment tax credits. Alternatively, in order to avoid scaling prob-
lems, a dummy variable can denote the availability of tax preference items. 
Overall, the empirical evidence based on a tax code progressivity dummy indicating in-
come in the convex tax region provides support for the tax hypothesis (Table 6) (Haushalter, 
2000; Howton and Perfect, 1998; Nance et al., 1993). In contrast, marginal (or average) tax 
rate proxies can lead to significant results, but in the wrong direction (Haushalter, 2000). 
There is, however, some evidence to support the tax hypothesis when the tax savings from 
volatility reductions are considered (Dionne and Triki, 2005; Dionne and Garand, 2003). 
This might be explained by the fact that the tax incentive to hedge in order to increase lever-
age is larger than the tax incentive of progressivity (Graham and Rogers, 2002; Graham and 
Smith, 1999). Scaled values and dummies for tax preference items generally lead to qualita-
tively similar findings. In the majority of cases, tax-loss carry-forwards do not significantly 
associate with corporate hedging. In contrast, tax credits provide (stronger) incentives to en-
gage in financial risk management (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Dionne and Garand, 
2003). 
In sum, there is some, albeit weak empirical support for the tax hypothesis. The diffi-
culties of finding empirical support for this hypothesis might be due to the fact that the tax 
incentives to hedge are relatively small compared to other incentives and might thus be hard 
to identify in statistical tests. It is also possible that firms with the strongest convexity in their 
tax code are small firms with zero expected income. Last but not least, income volatility can 
be reduced by other means than corporate risk management (Graham and Rogers, 2002). 
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2.3 Country-specific Determinants of Hedging 
Decisions of firms to engage in risk management may not only be determined by firm char-
acteristics, but the characteristics of the country they are located in may provide additional 
factors that impact hedging at the firm level. In particular, firms located in economies with 
more developed and liquid derivatives markets may hedge more because they have greater 
access to derivatives and thus can hedge more cheaply. The legal system might also affect 
corporate hedging. In countries with strong legal systems, the costs of contracting might be 
low, thus facilitating corporate derivatives’ use. In contrast, it could be the case that the gains 
from corporate hedging might be higher in countries with weak legal systems due to higher 
direct bankruptcy costs, rendering corporate hedging more valuable. At the same time, share-
holders can easily replace managers as a result of weak firm performance in countries with 
stronger shareholder rights, thus creating an incentive for managers to hedge against weak 
firm performance caused by financial risk. In a different vein, firms located in smaller econ-
omies that tend to be less stable may have stronger incentives to engage in hedging. By the 
same token, firms in economies with high economic, financial, and political risk are likely to 
exhibit higher derivatives’ use (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Bodnar et al., 2003). 
While country-specific determinants of derivatives’ use at the firm level have so far not 
been widely examined, it appears that the size of a country’s local derivatives market associ-
ates positively and significantly with a firm’s hedging decision, which is consistent with the 
costs of hedging being lower in more liquid derivatives markets. Moreover, firms headquar-
tered in countries facing high financial and economic risks usually hedge more, since they 
face larger exposures, while firms headquartered in countries with high political risk tend to 
employ corporate risk management less frequently. The evidence on other country-specific 
theories is mixed at best (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009). 
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2.4 Direct Evidence of Value Creation through Corporate Risk Management 
An alternative to testing whether firms for which theory suggests that they have large incen-
tives to hedge employ corporate risk management more frequently than firms with low incen-
tives is to directly test for the impact of corporate hedging on firm value, often measured by 
relative valuation metrics such as market-to-book.14 The empirical evidence provides some 
support for an increase of shareholder wealth through corporate risk management, for in-
stance by approximately 4% for a large sample of U.S. firms with exchange rate exposure 
(Allayannis and Weston, 2001) and 12-16% for a sample of firms belonging to the U.S. air-
line industry (Carter et al., 2006). Moreover, there is some evidence that the value impact of 
corporate risk management might depend on corporate governance structures, i.e. there 
seems to be a positive value impact only in countries with strong corporate governance (Al-
layannis et al., 2004). 
In contrast, other studies either find insignificant value effects, or even that corporate 
hedging decreases firm value (Guay and Kothari, 2003; Nguyen and Faff, 2003). Neverthe-
less, these tests potentially suffer from difficulties of correctly specifying the empirical tests. 
To illustrate, it might be the case that the supportive evidence in previous studies is driven by 
the fact that derivatives’ use proxies for other firm attributes which are known to affect 
shareholder wealth (Lookman, 2003). Again, there is additional evidence from more detailed 
data available for commodity-based industries. In particular, a recent study investigates the 
hedging activities of 119 U.S. oil and gas producers from 1998 to 2001 and evaluates their 
                                                 
14 The literature often refers to this ratio also as Tobin’s Q. Note that Tobin was trying to identify a mac-
roeconomic investment function and argued that a firm should invest to the point where market value/book 
value = 1. Note also that the valuation measures that are typically being used in empirical tests for value effects 
of corporate hedging are average ratios, not marginal ones as suggested by Tobin. We thank Clifford W. Smith, 
Jr., for pointing this out. 
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effect on firm value, based on detailed information on the extent of hedging and on the valua-
tion of oil and gas reserves (Jin and Jorion, 2006). While hedging reduces the firms’ stock 
price sensitivity to oil and gas prices, hedging does not seem to affect the market value of 
firms in this industry. The evidence of studies directly analyzing the value impact of corpo-
rate hedging is thus fairly mixed and inconclusive to date as well, suggesting the need for 
further empirical, and possibly theoretical, analysis on this issue. 
As often in corporate finance, empirical tests of value effects of corporate hedging are 
plagued by endogeneity problems, i.e. firm value determines the hedging choice, rather than 
hedging determining value. Several papers have dealt with these issues in various ways, such 
as simultaneous equations models (Bartram, Brown and Fehle, 2009; Graham and Rogers, 
2002), or sample selection (Jin and Jorion, 2006; Guay, 1999). Bartram et al. (2006) study a 
global sample of 6,896 non-financial firms from 47 countries. Controlling for endogeneity 
using several different techniques, they find strong evidence that the use of financial deriva-
tives reduces firm risk as well as some evidence that derivative use is related to higher firm 
value (as measured by market-to-book). 
In summa, the comprehensive analysis of positive theories of value creation through 
corporate risk management and the corresponding extensive body of empirical evidence sug-
gests as a bottom line that these theoretical arguments are rather unsuccessful in determining 
derivatives use by non-financial firms. This main conclusion, however, is consistent with 
arguments and evidence presented in Bartram, Brown and Fehle (2009) suggesting deriva-
tives use as part of the financial strategy of the firm, taking into account the type and level of 
financial risks, the availability of risk management tools, and the operating environment of 
the firm. In particular, the evidence suggests that derivatives use is related to debt levels and 
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maturity, dividend policy, holdings of liquid assets, and the degree of operating hedging. At 
the same time, corporations do not just use financial derivatives, but rely heavily on pass-
through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt to manage financial risk (Bartram, 
Brown and Minton, 2009; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Kedia and Mozumdar, 2003). As a result, 
the impact of financial risk, such as unexpected changes in exchange rates, on non-financial 
firms is generally small, after accounting for the effect of different forms of hedging, as evi-
denced by low fractions of firms with significant foreign exchange rate exposure (see e.g. 
Jorion 1990)15. At the same time, the hedging decisions of firms may be influenced by what 
other firms in the same industry do, as an unhedged firm’s foreign exchange exposure in-
creases with the extent of hedging in the industry (Nain, 2004). 
2.5 Challenges and Limitation of Empirical Tests 
Empirical tests of positive theories of corporate risk management are challenging. Conse-
quently, the results of empirical studies are subject to various caveats and limitations that are 
important to consider when interpreting the findings.16 As mentioned above, most empirical 
studies do not account for the endogeneity of variables describing different dimensions of 
corporate financial policy and strategy. To illustrate, empirical studies typically use measures 
of investment opportunities, leverage, debt maturity, dividends, executive stock options, cash 
holdings, Altman’s Z-score, ownership concentration, governance index, etc., which are all 
endogenous at some level. As a result, the overwhelming majority of the available empirical 
evidence suffers from a serious simultaneous equations bias (Guay, 1999). 
                                                 
15 See Bartram and Bodnar (2007) for a review of the extensive literature on foreign exchange rate expo-
sure. 
16 We are indebted to Clifford W. Smith, Jr., for emphasizing the discussion in this section. 
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Moreover, a fundamental identification problem rears its head in this context. To illus-
trate, it is challenging to find empirical proxies of determinants of corporate hedging that are 
not at the same time also determinants of other corporate finance dimensions such as lever-
age, compensation or payout policy, and vice versa. Worse, it is not clear that financial the-
ory is as yet rich enough to resolve this problem. For example, most determinants of leverage 
are also important for hedging decisions (Graham and Rogers, 2002). Only few, recent stud-
ies have tried to address these issues, while many studies do not recognize the problem, let 
alone employ statistical methods, such as simultaneous equations models and structural cor-
porate finance models, that may allow alleviating the problems and take a step towards yield-
ing unbiased estimates of the underlying structural parameters.17
It is also important to appreciate that there are variables whose impact on risk man-
agement is non-linear. A number of papers argue, for example, that the firm’s investment 
opportunity set affects its hedging incentive, since more growth opportunities imply bigger 
underinvestment problems, and higher costs imply stronger motives to hedge. But more as-
sets in place (i.e. fewer growth opportunities) entail also bigger free cash flow problems, 
which mean stronger incentives to hedge (Morellec and Smith, 2007). A detailed understand-
ing of the underlying structural parameters is required in order to be able to capture these 
effects properly in empirical analyses. Moreover, financial theory does not clearly indicate 
that these firm-specific parameters are appropriately estimated using cross-sectional data. 
In addition, existing theories pertain to the economic motives of financial risk man-
agement or hedging in general. Nevertheless, empirical tests frequently focus only on one 
                                                 
17 Papers that use simultaneous equations models or other techniques to control endogeneity include Bar-
tram, Brown and Fehle (2009), Bartram et al. (2006), Jin and Jorion (2006), Graham and Rogers (2002), Guay 
(1999). 
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single dimension of risk management, namely on the use of financial derivatives, to proxy for 
hedging at the firm level. In contrast, firms typically use a whole range of coordinated risk 
management instruments, including foreign currency debt, operational hedging measures, 
and pass-through. However, there is only limited analysis of the choice between hedging 
with different instruments (such as foreign currency derivatives or foreign currency debt).18 
To illustrate, a company may have an exposure and a strong motive to hedge, but might do so 
using hybrid debt instruments (e.g. foreign currency debt, which can be decomposed into a 
domestic bond plus an embedded currency derivative) instead of (stand-alone) derivatives. In 
fact, very little of the theory is developed at a sufficient level of detail to specify the particu-
lar hedging instrument that should be used (Bartram, 2006; Gay et al., 2003; Brown and Toft, 
2002). 
In general, the actual extent of hedging by corporations is extremely difficult to assess. 
This is true not only with regards to the fact that firms use a portfolio of different risk man-
agement measures. Even with regards to just the use of financial derivatives, the extent of 
hedging is hard to quantify.19 Beyond potential limitations of accounting disclosure, expo-
sures of firms vary over time, and so does the size of their hedges for each horizon into the 
future. Firms effectively hold (and roll over) portfolios of derivatives with different payoff 
profiles (linear and non-linear), notional amounts, expiration dates, exercise prices, etc., and 
the combined effect of this portfolio on the risk profile of the firm is hard to assess, since 
hedging metrics like deltas depend on the prices at which they are evaluated. Finally, most 
empirical studies classify firms as either hedgers or non-hedgers, without allowing for the 
                                                 
18 Mello et al. (1995) examine the role of operational hedging and its relation to financial hedging, while 
Bodnar et al. (2002) consider operational hedging and pass-through. 
19 See, for instance, Guay and Kothari (2003). 
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possibility that firms could move between the two groups over time. These data problems 
limit the power of empirical tests in this area. 
3 Summary and Conclusion 
Although corporate risk management cannot increase shareholder value in an M&M world, 
hedging at the firm level can create value to the benefit of shareholders in the presence of 
real world capital market imperfections, such as direct and indirect costs of financial distress, 
costly external financing, and taxes. This paper carefully compiles, classifies and analyzes 
the extant evidence on this issue culled from numerous empirical studies, highlighting areas 
where the evidence is ambiguous and further research is needed. Overall, most proxy vari-
ables used to test whether corporate hedging can lower agency costs, such as the underin-
vestment or the asset substitution problem, lead to fairly mixed results, though a small num-
ber of proxies, such as R&D expenditures, show effects in the predicted direction at conven-
tional significance levels. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn from tests whether corporate risk management alle-
viates agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. In particular, while management 
share programs in many cases induce firms to hedge, there is little convincing evidence that 
executive stock option programs lead to opposite incentives. In contrast, some support exists 
for the coordinated financing and investment hypothesis when examined separately from 
other agency costs theories. Support for positive theories based on bankruptcy and financial 
distress costs mainly stems from the long-term debt ratio, which may suffer from important 
endogeneity problems with regards to financial risk management. Other proxies, e.g. the in-
terest coverage ratio, on the other hand, often associate with corporate hedging in the wrong 
direction or do not obtain significance at conventional levels. 
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Finally, only weak empirical support exists for the tax hypothesis, according to which 
corporate risk management can increase shareholder value by stabilizing taxable income, 
thus decreasing the average tax burden of firms in the presence of convex tax schedules. This 
might be attributed to the fact that the tax incentive to hedge is small compared to other posi-
tive rationales, such as the increase in debt capacity. 
The comprehensive review of the existing empirical evidence thus suggests surpris-
ingly mixed empirical support for rationales of hedging with derivatives at the firm level. At 
the same time, it may be that other factors not well motivated by existing risk management 
theory, such as earnings smoothing, speculation, or industry competition, that are difficult to 
examine empirically, provide a better explanation of the results (Core et al., 2002; Brown, 
2001; Tufano, 1996). The results are, however, consistent with derivatives use being just one 
part of a broader financial strategy that considers the type and level of financial risks, the 
availability of risk management tools, and the operating environment of the firm. Moreover, 
pass-through, operational hedging, and foreign currency debt are also important dimensions 
of firms’ hedging strategies, with derivatives possibly playing mostly a fine-tune role. 
At the same time, tests of corporate hedging motives are plagued by various empirical 
challenges and limitations. In particular, most empirical studies face significant endogeneity 
and identification problems of variables describing different dimensions of corporate finan-
cial policy and strategy that are hard to address. Moreover, the impact of some variables on 
risk management is more complex than typically considered, and a detailed understanding of 
the underlying structural parameters is required in order to capture these effects properly in 
empirical analyses. It is also important to note that existing theories describe motives of cor-
porate hedging in general, while empirical tests frequently focus only on one single dimen-
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sion of risk management, namely on the use of financial derivatives, to proxy for hedging at 
the firm level. Furthermore, it is challenging to assess the extent to which firms hedge, given 
the complex combination of different hedging channels with different payoff profiles, time 
horizons, etc. as well as exposures changing over time. Finally, most empirical studies clas-
sify firms as either hedgers or non-hedgers, without allowing for the possibility that firms 
could move between the two groups over time. These important data and methodology issues 
suggest some caution when interpreting the existing empirical evidence. 
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Table 1 - Overview of Proxy Variables 
This table provides an overview of proxy variables used in empirical studies testing positive rationales on how corporate risk management can create shareholder value. The 
vertical columns on the left indicate to which broad category of positive rationales the proxy variable belongs. Note that some proxies can belong to more than one 
category, i.e. can be used to test more than one positive theory. Next, the proxy name and the computation formula are listed. Hypothesized sign indicates the predicted 







Proxy Proxy formula Source
Analysts Number of analysts following firm "-" Géczy et al. 1997
Analysts forecast accuracy Absolute[(Predicted - actual EPS)/price] "-" Lin/Smith 2007, DaDalt et al. 2002
Analysts forecast dispersion Standard deviation of analysts EPS forecasts "-" DaDalt et al. 2002
Independence of Board (% of) Unrelated directors on board or dummy, if CEO = COB "+"/"-" Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Dionne/Triki 2004
Institutional investors Percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors "-" Dionne/Triki 2005, Dionne/Triki 2004, Graham/Rogers 2002, Rogers 2002, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997
Multiple classes of shares "+"
Blockholders "?"
CEO cash Sum of CEO salary and bonus (over total compensation) "-" Lel 2006, Knopf et al. 2002
CEO option ownership Number or market value of options held by CEO "?"c Dionne/Triki 2005, Knopf et al. 2002, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Haushalter 2000
CEO share ownership Number or market value of shares held by CEO "+" Dionne/Triki 2005, Knopf et al. 2002, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Tufano 1996
Debt maturity % of debt which matures in more than 1 or 2 years "+" Bartram et al. 2007, Géczy et al. 1997
Option ownership "?"a
"-" Lel 2006, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002, Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002, Rogers 2002
"+" Lel 2006, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002
Share ownership Market value of shares owned by managers (and directors) "+"
% Share ownership
Shares owned by managers (and directors)/total outstanding shares
"+" Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Haushalter 2000, Berkman/Bradbury 1996
Officer's tenure Number of years officers hold in their current job "-" Tufano 1996
Acquisition activities Acquisition activities' value (scaled) "+" Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Haushalter 2000, Tufano 1996
Asset growth ratio "+"
Book-to-market (or inverse); Book value of common equity/market value of common equity "-"
 sometimes called Tobin's Q
Earnings-price ratio (or inverse) Earnings/share price "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Gay/Nam 1998, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Dolde 1995, Francis/Stephan 1990
Exploration activities Exploration expenditures (scaled) "+" Dionne/Triki 2005, Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002, Haushalter 2000, Tufano 1996
Market-adjusted cumulative returns Cumulative firm return (over market return) "+" Gay/Nam 1998
Market-to-book/leverage interaction Market-to-book * leverage "+" Bartram et al. 2007, Graham/Rogers 2002, Allayannis et al. 2001
Property, plant, & equipment Capital expenditures (scaled) "+"
Regulated industry Dummy which indicates whether a firm is in a regulated industry "-" Rogers 2002, Mian 1996





































































Sensitivity of CEO portfolio w.r.t. stock 
price
Sensitivity of CEO portfolio w.r.t. 
standard deviation of returns
Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Knopf et al. 2002, Haushalter 2000, Tufano 1996
Bartram et al. 2007, Lin/Smith 2007, Dionne/Triki 2004, Rogers 2002, Allayannis et al. 2001, Haushalter 2000, Géczy et al.
1997
Bartram et al. 2007
Number, dummy, or market value of shares obtainable by options
(exercisable within 60 days) by managers (and directors)
Bartram et al. 2007, Lin/Smith 2007, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers 2002, Allayannis/Ofek 2001,
Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Dolde 1995, Nance et al. 1993
Berkman/Bradbury 1996
Bartram et al. 2007, Lel 2006, Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002,
Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002, Rogers 2002, Allayannis et al. 2001, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Guay 1999, Gay/Nam 1998, Fok et al.
1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Mian 1996, Nance et al. 1993
Current year change in net tangible assets + depreciation/ net income + 
depreciation
Number or percentage of outside investors holding more than 5%/10% of
outstanding shares
Change in Black Scholes value of CEO portfolio resulting from a one
percent change in the stock price
Change in Black Scholes value of CEO portfolio resulting from a one
percent change in the standard deviation of returns (scaled)
Dummy which indicates whether multiple classes of common stock exist
in a firm
Bartram et al. 2007, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Dionne/Triki 2004, Haushalter 2000, Gay/Nam 1998, Géczy et al. 1997, 
Tufano 1996
Lel 2006, Dionne/Triki 2004, Haushalter 2000, Gay/Nam 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Tufano 1996
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Proxy Proxy formula Source
Advertising expenses Advertising expsenses (scaled) "+" Dolde 1995
Altman Z score Bankruptcy index "-" Francis/Stephan 1990
Bond rating Dummies for AAA+ to D-rated companies "-" Haushalter 2000, Dolde 1995
Cash flow availibility Cash flow (scaled) "-" Haushalter 2000, Howton/Perfect 1998
Convertible debt Book value of convertible debt (scaled) "?
Credit risk spread Spread between bond yield and 10-year Treasury notes "+" Dolde 1995
Current ratio [Current Assets(-Total) / Current Liabilities(-Total)] "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Allayannis et al. 2001
Dividend yield/dividend pay-out ratio "?"
Interest coverage ratio EBIT/interest "-"
Leverage to cash comparison "+"
Long-term debt ratio "+"
Operating leverage or: cash costs Production costs per unit of output "+" Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Haushalter 2000, Tufano 1996
Preferred stock Book value of preferred stock (scaled) "?"
Profitability (1) EBIT/sales (gross margin) "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Dionne/Triki 2004, Allayannis et al. 2001
Profitability (2) Sales "-" Dionne/Triki 2004, Allayannis et al. 2001, Fok et al. 1997, Dolde 1995, Francis et al. 1993, Houston/Mueller 1988
Profitability (3) Return on assets (ROA) "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Rogers 2002, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Guay 1999
Reserves Proven and probable reserves "-" Dionne/Garand 2003, Tufano 1996
SG&A expenses SG&A expenses (scaled) "+" Dionne/Triki 2004, Dolde 1995
Short-term liquidity (quick ratio) Cash+short-term investments/current liabilities "-"
Size "-"
Tangible assets Tangible assets (scaled) "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Howton/Perfect 1998
Tax-loss carry-forwards (1) Dummy which indicates the availibility of TLCFs "+" Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Howton/Perfect 1998, Mian 1996, Berkman/Bradbury 1996
Tax-loss carry-forwards (2) Absolute available TLCFs (scaled) "+"
Marginal (or: average) tax rates Current year's marginal tax rate (or: average tax rate per year) "-" Bartram et al. 2007, Dionne/Triki 2004, Haushalter 2000, Francis/Stephan 1990
Progressive corporate tax structure "+" Howton/Perfect 1998, Mian 1996, Nance et al. 1993
Tax credits (1) Dummy which indicates the availibility of TCs "+" Bartram et al. 2007, Mian 1996
Tax credits (2) Absolute available TCs (scaled) or deferred income (scaled) "+" Bartram et al. 2007, Dionne/Garand 2003, Fok et al. 1997, Nance et al. 1993
Tax savings "+" Dionne/Triki 2005, Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Graham/Rogers 2002
Bartram et al. 2007, Dionne/Garand 2003, Knopf et al. 2002, Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy
et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Nance et al. 1993
Bartram et al. 2007, Lin/Smith 2007, Lel 2006, Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Dionne/Triki 2004,
Dionne/Garand 2003, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002, Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002, Rogers 2002, Allayannis/Ofek 2001,
Haushalter 2000, Guay 1999, Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury
1996, Mian 1996, Tufano 1996, Nance et al. 1993, Francis/Stephan 1990, Houston/Mueller 1988, Block/Gallagher 1986
Market value of common stock + book value of debt and preferred stock;
alternatively total assets
Bartram et al. 2007, Lin/Smith 2007, Borokhovich et al. 2004, Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Rajgopal/Shevlin
2002, Allayannis et al. 2001, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Mian 1996,
Tufano 1996, Nance et al. 1993
Bartram et al. 2007, Lel 2006, Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury
1996, Nance et al. 1993
Dummy which indicates that a firm has an above sample median leverage
ratio and a below medain current ratio
Cash dividend/closing share price; cash dividend/total earnings; or
dividend dummy
Haushalter 2000
Lin/Smith 2007, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002, Rogers 2002, Gay/Nam 1998, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997,
Tufano 1996, Dolde 1995, Nance et al. 1993
Expected tax liability for full volatility case - expected tax liability with
volatility reduced by 5%/sales
Dummy which indicates whether any part of a 95% confidence interval
around reported earnings lies inside the convex tax region
Bartram et al. 2007, Lin/Smith 2007, Lel 2006, Dionne/Triki 2005, Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Borokhovich et al 2004,
Dionne/Triki 2004, Dionne/Garand 2003, Graham/Rogers 2002, Knopf et al. 2002, Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002, Rogers 2002,
Allayannis et al. 2001, Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Haushalter 2000, Guay 1999, Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al.
1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Mian 1996, Tufano 1996, Dolde 1995, Nance et al. 1993,
Francis/Stephan 1990, Block/Gallagher 1986
Bartram et al. 2007, Knopf et al. 2002, Allayannis et al. 2001, Guay 1999, Gay/Nam 1998, Howton/Perfect 1998, Fok et al.
1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Nance et al. 1993, Francis/Stephan 1990







Bartram et al. 2007, Lel 2006, Mardsen/Prevost 2005, Dionne/Garand 2003, Knopf et al. 2002, Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002,
Allayannis/Ofek 2001, Haushalter 2000, Fok et al. 1997, Géczy et al. 1997, Berkman/Bradbury 1996, Mian 1996, Nance et

















































Table 2 - Empirical Evidence on Asymmetric Information Hypothesis 
This table provides an overview of the evidence on rationales how corporate risk management can increase firm 
value in the presence of asymmetric information. For each proxy, the predicted sign is indicated (whenever de-
terminable). A 'yes' in the table indicates that the evidence is in the predicted direction, 'no' indicates the oppo-
site and a 'question mark' an unclear direction. Numbers below 'yes', 'no' and 'question mark' are p-values. Note 
that these p-values cannot be always taken literally, as most studies test many different specifications. Thus, 0.1 
implies some weak evidence, 0.05 some strong and weak evidence, and 0.01 strong evidence. Significance at 
conventional levels (p-value < 10%) in the correct direction is indicated as boldface in the table. Panel A pre-










Proxies accuracy dispersion Board
Hypothesized sign "-" "-" "-" "?" "+" "-" "+"
PANEL A: Univariate Results






Mardsen/Prevost 20051 pos./neg. no/no
no/no no/no
Dionne/Triki 2004 no yes
0.01 0.01























Fok et al. 1997 no
0.01




PANEL B: Multivariate Results






Mardsen/Prevost 20051 neg. no/no
no no/no
Borokhovich et al. 2004 neg. yes
no 0.05
Dionne/Triki 2004 yes yes
no 0.01










Fok et al. 1997 no
0.01








1 The numbers on the left of each entry are for the year 1994 and the numbers on the right for the year 1997. 




Table 3 - Empirical Evidence on Shareholder-Debtholder Conflicts Hypothesis 
This table provides an overview of the evidence on rationales how corporate risk management can increase firm value in the 
presence of agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders. For each proxy, the predicted sign is indicated (whenever 
determinable). A 'yes' in the table indicates that the evidence is in the predicted direction, 'no' indicates the opposite and a 'ques-
tion mark' an unclear direction. Numbers below 'yes', 'no' and 'question mark' are p-values. Note that these p-values cannot be 
always taken literally, as most studies test many different specifications. Thus, 0.1 implies some weak evidence, 0.05 some strong 
and weak evidence, and 0.01 strong evidence. Significance at conventional levels (p-value < 10%) in the correct direction is 















PANEL A: Univariate Results
Proxies
Hypothesized sign "+" "+" "-" "-" "+" "+" "+" "+" "-" "+"
Bartram et al. 2007 no yes no no
0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01








Dionne/Triki 2004 yes yes
no no






Gay/Nam 1998 no yes yes yes
no no 0.05 0.05
Fok et al. 1997 no yes
no 0.01
Gézcy et al. 1997 yes no yes
0.01 0.05 0.01
Berkman/Bradbury 1996 no no
no 0.05
Mian 1996 no yes
0.01IR 0.05FX
Tufano 1996 no no
no no
Dolde 1995 yes yes
0.05 0.05




















































PANEL B: Multivariate Results
Proxies
Hypothesized sign "+" "+" "-" "-" "+" "+" "+" "+" "-" "+"










Borokhovich et al. 2004 yes
0.1
Dionne/Triki 2004 no no
0.1 no
Dionne/Garand 2003 no no
no no
DaDalt et al. 2002
Graham/Rogers 2002 no yes no
0.01 0.05 0.05
Knopf et al. 2002 yes yes
0.05 0.01
Rajgopal/Shevlin 2002 yes yes
0.1 0.1
Rogers 2002 no yes yes yes
no no 0.01 0.01
Allayannis et al. 2001 yes yes no
no no no
Allayannis/Ofek 2001 no yes
no 0.05




Gay/Nam 1998 yes yes yes yes
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05
Howton/Perfect 1998 yes
0.01
Fok et al. 1997 no yes
no 0.01
Gézcy et al. 1997 yes yes yes
no 0.1 0.01
Berkman/Bradbury 1996 no yes
no 0.1fair
Mian 1996 no yes
0.01IR 0.05

























1 The numbers on the left of each entry apply to firms with strong and the numbers on the right to firms with weak corporate governance structures (Lel, 2006). 
2 The numbers on the left of each entry are for the year 1994 and the numbers on the right for the year 1997. 
IR Evidence relates only to interest rates derivatives; FX Evidence relates only to foreign exchange rate derivatives. 
Fair Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured as fair values; Not (notional) Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured by notional values. 
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Table 4 - Empirical Evidence on Manager-Shareholder Conflicts Hypothesis 
This table provides an overview of the evidence on rationales how corporate risk management can increase firm value 
in the presence of agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. For each proxy, the predicted sign is indicated 
(whenever determinable). A 'yes' in the table indicates that the evidence is in the predicted direction, 'no' indicates the 
opposite and a 'question mark' an unclear direction. Numbers below 'yes', 'no' and 'question mark' are p-values. Note 
that these p-values cannot be always taken literally, as most studies test many different specifications. Thus, 0.1 implies 
some weak evidence, 0.05 some strong and weak evidence, and 0.01 strong evidence. Significance at conventional lev-
els (p-value < 10%) in the correct direction is indicated as boldface in the table. Panel A presents univariate results, 
whereas Panel B presents multivariate results. 
Sensitivity Sensitivity
Proxies CEO price CEO sigma
Hypothesized sign "?" "?" "+" "?" "+" "-" "+" "+" "-"
PANEL A: Univariate Results




Dionne/Triki 2005 pos. yes
0.01 0.05
Mardsen/Prevost 20052 pos./neg. no/yes
no/no no/no
Dionne/Triki 2004 pos. yes
0.01 0.01
Haushalter 2000 "?" pos. neg. yes no
0.01 0.05 0.05 no 0.05
Gay/Nam 1998 pos. no
no 0.05
Fok et al. 1997 no
0.01




Tufano 1996 neg. pos. yes
0.1 0.1 0.1
PANEL B: Multivariate Results
Bartram et al. 2007 pos.
0.05
Lel 20061 no/yes no/yes yes/yes
no/0.05 no/0.01 no/0.01
Dionne/Triki 2005 neg. yes
0.01 0.01
Mardsen/Prevost 20052 neg. no
no no
Borokhovich et al. 2004 neg. neg.
no no
Dionne/Triki 2004 neg. yes
0.05 0.01
Graham/Rogers 2002 yes no
0.1 no
Knopf et al. 2002 neg. pos. no pos. yes yes










































ter 2000 neg. pos. neg. no no
0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Gay/Nam 1998 pos. no
0.1 no
ok et al. 1997 no
0.05




Tufano 1996 neg. yes neg. yes yes













1 The numbers on the left of each entry apply to firms with strong and the numbers on the right to firms with weak corporate governance structures (Lel, 2006). 
2 The numbers on the left of each entry are for the year 1994 and the numbers on the right for the year 1997. 
Fair Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured as fair values; Not (notional) Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured by notional values. 
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Table 5 - Empirical Evidence of Financial Distress Hypothesis 
This table provides an overview of the evidence on rationales how corporate risk management can increase firm value in the pres-
ence of financial distress costs. For each proxy, the predicted sign is indicated (whenever determinable). A 'yes' in the table indi-
cates that the evidence is in the predicted direction, 'no' indicates the opposite and a 'question mark' an unclear direction. Numbers 
below 'yes', 'no' and 'question mark' are p-values. Note that these p-values cannot be always taken literally, as most studies test 
many different specifications. Thus, 0.1 implies some weak evidence, 0.05 some strong and weak evidence, and 0.01 strong evi-
dence. Significance at conventional levels (p-value < 10%) in the correct direction is indicated as boldface in the table. Panel A 
presents univariate results, whereas Panel B presents multivariate results. 
 PANEL A: Univariate Results
Proxies
Hypothesized sign "+" "+" "?" "-" "?" "-" "-" "+" "?" "-" "-" "-" "+" "-" "-" "-" "-"
Bartram et al. 2007 pos. pos. no no yes pos. no yes no yes
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Lin/Smith 2007 yes yes no
0.01 0.01 0.01




neg./pos. yes/yes yes/yes no/no
no/0.05 0.01/no no/0.1 0.01/0.01
Dionne/Triki 2004 yes yes no yes no
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Allayannis et al. 2001 no no no no yes
no 0.1 no no no
Haushalter 2000 no yes neg. yes yes
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Guay 1999 no yes no no
no 0.05 0.05 0.01
Gay/Nam 1998 pos. no yes pos. yes
no no 0.01 0.1 no
Fok et al. 1997 neg. pos. yes yes pos. no yes no
0.1 no 0.1 no 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Gézcy et al. 1997 neg. neg. yes no neg. yes no
no no no 0.1 no 0.1 0.01
pos. pos. yes yes pos. yes no
0.05 0.01 no 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01
Mian 1996 pos. yes yes no
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.01
Tufano 1996 yes yes no yes no
no no no 0.05 no
Dolde 1995 yes no no no yes
0.1 no no 0.01 0.05
Nance et al. 1993 neg. pos. yes no neg. yes no
no 0.01 no no no 0.1 0.01
pos. yes yes no no yes
0.01 no 0.05 0.01 0.01 no
no no
no no















































Table 5 - Empirical Evidence of Financial Distress Hypothesis (continued) 
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is/Stephan 1990 pos./neg. yes no yes


















































PANEL B: Multivariate Results
Tangible
Proxies assets
Hypothesized sign "+" "+" "?" "-" "?" "-" "-" "+" "?" "-" "-" "-" "+" "-" "-" "-" "-"
Bartram et al. 2007 pos. no yes yes yes no
0.01 no 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01
Lin/Smith 2007 yes yes no
0.01 0.01 0.01
Lel 20061 neg./neg. pos./neg. yes/yes no/no
0.01/no no/no 0.01/no 0.01/0.01
Dionne/Triki 2005 yes 
0.01
Mardsen/Prevost 20052 neg. yes yes no 
no 0.05 0.1 0.01
Borokhovich et al. 2004 yes yes no
0.01 no 0.01
Dionne/Triki 2004 yes yes no no
0.05 0.05 no 0.01
Dionne/Garand 2003 yes neg. yes neg. no yes
0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.1
Graham/Rogers 2002 yes no
0.01 0.01
Knopf et al. 2002 pos. yes yes neg. yes
no no 0.01 no no
Rajgapol/Shevlin 2002 pos. no yes no
no no 0.01 0.05
Rogers 2002 yes yes no
0.1 0.01 0.01
Allayannis et al. 2001 no no yes yes
0.01 no 0.1 0.05
Allayannis/Ofek 2001 neg. no no yes
no 0.05 no no
Haushalter 2000 yes yes neg. yes yes yes
0.05 0.1 0.01 0.01 0.01 no
Guay 1999 yes yes yes no
0.05 0.05 no 0.05
Gay/Nam 1998 neg. yes yes neg. yes
no no 0.01 no no
Howton/Perfect 1998 zero no yes zero yes no yes
no no 0.05IR no 0.05 no 0.1IR
Fok et al. 1997 neg. pos. yes yes pos. no yes no
0.05 no 0.01 0.1 no 0.01 0.1 0.01
Gézcy et al. 1997 no yes no
no 0.05 0.01
pos./neg. pos. yes yes pos./neg. yes no
no 0.1 0.01 0.01 no 0.05fair 0.01
Mian 1996 no
0.01
Tufano 1996 yes yes yes yes no
no no 0.1 0.1 no
Dolde 1995 yes no yes
0.05 no 0.1
Nance et al. 1993 pos. pos. yes no neg. yes no
no 0.01 no no no no 0.1
1 The numbers on the left of each entry apply to firms with strong and the numbers on the right to firms with weak corporate governance structures (Lel, 2006). 
2 The numbers on the left of each entry are for the year 1994 and the numbers on the right for the year 1997. 
IR Evidence relates only to interest rates derivatives; FX Evidence relates only to foreign exchange rate derivatives. 
Fair Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured as fair values; Not (notional) Evidence relates only to the tests in which derivatives use is measured by notional values. 
Table 6 - Empirical Evidence of Taxes Hypothesis 
This table provides an overview of the evidence on rationales how corporate risk management can increase firm value 
in the presence of convex tax schedules. For each proxy, the predicted sign is indicated (whenever determinable). A 
'yes' in the table indicates that the evidence is in the predicted direction, 'no' indicates the opposite and a 'question 
mark' an unclear direction. Numbers below 'yes', 'no' and 'question mark' are p-values. Note that these p-values cannot 
be always taken literally, as most studies test many different specifications. Thus, 0.1 implies some weak evidence, 
0.05 some strong and weak evidence, and 0.01 strong evidence. Significance at conventional levels (p-value < 10%) 
in the correct direction is indicated as boldface in the table. Panel A presents univariate results, whereas Panel B 
presents multivariate results. 
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hesized sign "+" "-" "+" "+" "+" "+" "+"




D nne/Triki 2005 yes
no
M rdsen/Prevost 20051 yes/no
0.05/no
D nne/Triki 2004 no
no




Fok et al. 1997 yes yes
0.05 no











































PANEL A: Univariate Results
Proxies
H




































PANEL B: Multivariate Results
Proxies
Hypothesized sign "+" "-" "+" "+" "+" "+" "+"










Dionne/Garand 2003 yes yes
0.05 0.01
Graham/Rogers 2002 no no
0.05 no










Howton/Perfect 1998 yes no
0.01 no
Fok et al. 1997 yes no
no no

























1 The numbers on the left of each entry are for the year 1994 and the numbers on the right for the year 1997. 
IR Evidence relates only to interest rates derivatives; FX Evidence relates only to foreign exchange rate derivatives. 
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